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Abstract 
A significant strand of contemporary fiction engages with scientific models that highlight a 
constitutive interdependency between humanity and material realities such as the climate 
or the geological history of our planet. This article looks at the ways in which narrative may 
capture this human-nonhuman interrelation, which occupies the foreground of debates on 
the so-called Anthropocene. I argue that the formal dimension of scientific knowledge—as 
manifested by diagrams or metaphors used by scientists—is central to this narrative 
remediation. I explore two analogical strategies through which narrative may pursue a 
formal dialogue with science: clusters of metaphorical language and the global structuring of 
the plot. Rivka Galchen’s novel Atmospheric Disturbances (2008), for instance, builds on a 
visual representation of meteorological patterns in a storm (lifted from an actual scientific 
paper) to stage the narrator’s mental illness. Two other contemporary works (Orfeo by 
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Richard Powers and A Tale for the Time Being by Ruth Ozeki) integrate scientific models 
through the overall design of the plot. By offering close readings of these novels, I seek to 
expand work in the area of New Formalism and show how formal choices are crucial to 
bringing together the human-scale world and more-than-human phenomena.  
Introduction 
As an avant-garde composer, Peter Els, the protagonist of Richard Powers’s 2014 novel 
Orfeo, is no stranger to artistic experimentation. One of the most striking musical 
experiments we read about in the novel involves “soundtracks extracted from DNA—strange 
murmurings transposed from the notorious four-letter alphabet of nucleotides into the 
twelve pitches of the chromatic scale” (333). Invisible genetic material is thus made tangible 
through sound. But Peter’s intuition, which sparks the novel’s plot, is that this translation 
can be reversed:  
The real art would be to reverse the process, to inscribe a piece for 
safekeeping into the genetic material of a bacterium. The precise sounds 
that he inscribed into the living cell were almost immaterial: birdsong, a 
threnody, the raw noise of this arboretum, music spun from the brain that 
those self-replicating patterns had led to, four billion years on. Here was 
the one durable medium, one that might give any piece a shot at surviving 
until alien archaeologists came by to determine what had happened to the 
wasted Earth. (333) 
By encoding music in genetic patterns, Peter is looking for a ground, a “durable medium,” for 
art that would transcend the spatiotemporal strictures of the human species: the limitations 
of our visual perception, which keep humans from directly experiencing genetic structure; 
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but also the posthuman temporality of the “wasted Earth” observed by alien archeologists. 
Whether seen in spatial or in temporal terms, Peter’s art attempts to supersede the 
reassuring “intermediate world” of embodied experience, to borrow a term from ecological 
psychologist J. J. Gibson (22): the human-scale reality to which our perceptual and cognitive 
apparatus is attuned. Peter’s art, as the quotation spells out, is an art of “pattern,” or more 
accurately of bridging between patterns: it connects the sensible structure of music to the 
insensible structure of genetic material, the double helix of DNA. What Peter realizes, 
however, is that the directionality of this process is in itself meaningful. In “soundtracks 
extracted from DNA,” invisible patterns are scaled upwards, made sensible. In his DNA 
compositions, the sensible patterns of music are made invisible: the result, as Peter puts it, is 
“wild forms and fresh sonorities. Tunes for forever, for no one” (299).  
Powers’s novel highlights the coming together of formal patterns at different spatial scales, 
as well as the divergent directionality implicit in movement across those scales: the upwards 
displacement (from the microscopic to the human-scale) of sounds extracted from DNA, the 
downwards displacement of composing music in DNA form. The problematics of scale is not 
new to literary studies, and to the humanities more generally; in fact, scale has been 
discussed extensively in recent ecocritical debates on the so-called Anthropocene, from 
Derek Woods’s “scale critique” to Timothy Clark’s “scale effects.” With the accumulation of 
scientific evidence for the ecological and climatological impact of industrial activity (through 
pollution and the emission of greenhouse gases, for instance), the mutual dependency of 
human societies and the environment has become increasingly clear (see Crutzen; 
Chakrabarty). Therefore, the human scale is revealed to be fundamentally entangled with 
phenomena that elude direct perception and can only be conceptualized through scientific 
experimentation and modeling; these “nonhuman” realities—to borrow the term 
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popularized by Richard Grusin in an influential collection—include entities and processes of 
vastly different magnitude, from DNA and CO2 molecules to large-scale meteorological 
patterns.  
This article seeks to bring into focus the specific contribution of narrative form to the 
imagination of nonhuman scales. As Timothy Morton notes, the field of ecocriticism “has 
overlooked the way in which all art—not just explicitly ecological art—hardwires the 
environment into its form” (11). While Morton’s comment, from his 2010 The Ecological 
Thought, is no longer completely accurate today, much remains to be done to marry 
ecocritical concerns and discussions on literary and narrative form. This is one of the core 
tasks of what Erin James calls an “econarratology.” My goal in this article is to show that 
narrative can engage with the nonhuman realities investigated by science along two 
dimensions, both of which—like Peter’s art—foreground pattern: clusters of related 
metaphors, at the micro-textual level; and the structural organization of plot at the macro-
level.  
The common denominator between these formal strategies is analogy. Whether it is realized 
in the linguistic device of metaphor or in larger plot patterns, analogy becomes the site of 
conversion between different spatiotemporal scales: it brings out continuities and unsettling 
ruptures between the intermediate world and other levels of reality. Often, analogy reveals 
human-nonhuman entanglements by breaking down—that is, by failing to fully capture 
scales beyond the human, a shortcoming that creates distinctive emotional effects in the 
audience. I will thus explore how formal patterns in narrative can contribute, both locally 
and globally, to the patterning of audiences’ narrative experiences. This contribution is 
modulated by forms derived from sensory perception (cognitive linguists call them “image 
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schemata”), which determine the overall affective “shape” of plot. This is the more 
speculative side of my argument, but it is crucial to raise the point that form is never merely 
a textual “given,” since it always ripples within each reader’s experience of narrative. 
Together with clusters of metaphorical language, the image schemata that structure plot 
create a formal possibility—again, based on analogy—for the narrative assimilation of 
scientific models. I will exemplify these ideas by offering close readings of three 
contemporary novels: along with Powers’s Orfeo, Rivka Galchen’s Atmospheric Disturbances 
and Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being, the latter of which will be the subject of an 
extended reading at the end of the article. 
Before turning to those examples, however, I will elaborate on the claim that contemporary 
narrative and scientific models of more-than-human realities can find a common ground in 
form. I will build on Caroline Levine’s version of New Formalism to contextualize my claim 
that the form of narrative is capacious enough to accommodate forms that exist well below, 
or far above, the intermediate world of human perception.  
Abstraction Techniques: Science and Form 
In Forms, a landmark contribution to a scholarly movement known as New Formalism (see 
Levinson), Caroline Levine focuses on how the forms of political or social action intersect 
with aesthetic form. This is made possible by a broad definition of form as “all shapes and 
configurations, all ordering principles, all patterns of repetition and difference” (3). In a 
reading of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s poem “The Young Queen,” for instance, Levine (73–
81) explores the interplay between poetic rhythm (i.e., meter and prosody) and the rhythms 
imposed by the social order, showing how the former can implicate and at the same time 
resist the latter. Narrative takes center stage in Levine’s account; she claims that stories are 
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particularly well equipped to capture “the experience of colliding forms . . . . Narratives are 
valuable heuristic forms, then, because they can set in motion multiple social forms and 
track them as they cooperate, come into conflict, and overlap, without positing an ultimate 
cause” (19). Put otherwise, narrative form is able to subsume a variety of socio-cultural 
forms. 
Levine’s account can be extended by considering how science itself produces a wide range of 
forms, which enter the domain of culture at large. Just as narrative can assimilate and 
challenge forms of institutional control and political power, it can interact in complex ways 
with the forms of science. What does it mean to apply the label “form” to science? At one 
level, formalization in science is a matter of abstraction: from a welter of data points, 
scientists extrapolate a model that expresses the relevant features or trends underlying the 
data. This movement towards a general law can certainly be called an act of formalization. 
But it is important to understand how this kind of abstraction is bound up with devices that 
are “formal” in a sense closer to the aesthetic meaning of the term. Philosopher of science 
Nancy Nersessian (11) identifies four “abstraction techniques” that scientists use as they 
develop and revise scientific models. Particularly promising, from my perspective in this 
article, are the first two techniques: (1) analogical reasoning and (2) imagistic reasoning.  
Under the heading of “analogical reasoning,” Nersessian discusses the role of analogical 
thinking in science: analogy draws attention to continuities and discontinuities between 
levels of reality (see also a seminal collection edited by Ortony). Nersessian’s argument turns 
on James Clerk Maxwell’s notion of electromagnetic field, but I will discuss an alternative 
example from 19th century science, which I find more illuminating than Nersessian’s: namely, 
Charles Darwin’s famous analogy between artificial selection and natural evolution in On the 
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Origin of Species. Darwin observes how pigeons are selectively bred by humans to display 
specific physical features; he builds on this idea, analogically, to understand how natural 
evolution operates on animal species, by selecting traits that improve an organism’s chances 
for reproduction. Yet the analogy is imperfect: as Darwin puts it, “man can act only on 
external and visible characters: Nature . . . cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as 
they may be useful to any being” (56). Even more crucially, natural selection is not driven by 
human intentionality and agency in the same way as artificial selection. Indeed, for 
Nersessian, it is when analogy breaks down that it is at its most useful, because the 
modifications required by an analogy to fit a given data set are a step towards a new theory.  
Physical representations, such as diagrams or other forms of data visualization, facilitate this 
process of abstraction; this is what Nersessian calls “imagistic reasoning.” She points out that 
such images “provide an intermediate level of abstraction between phenomena and 
mathematical forms of representation (formulae)” (25). Diagrams are human-scale 
equivalents of processes that cannot be observed directly; unlike purely mental images, they 
stabilize a phenomenon in a way that frees up cognitive resources in the scientist and 
potentially enables further inferences. A case in point is Darwin’s tree of life diagram in On 
the Origin of Species—a visual representation of the more-than-human temporality of 
speciation by way of natural selection. Darwin’s “I think” on top of a preliminary version of 
the tree of life in his notebooks (see Figure 1) is a further demonstration of the integral role 
of diagrammatic representation in the development of scientific models. 
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Figure 1 An early version of the tree of life diagram, from Charles Darwin’s notebooks. Copyright Cambridge University 
Library (https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/darwin/the-idea-takes-shape/i-think/). 
The formalism of science is thus not just a matter of inference—the movement to a higher 
level of generality, through statistical or mathematical models; it has to do with the 
conceptual and sensory forms that are employed by scientists in the process of knowledge 
formation and communication: conceptual forms, through analogy (and “tree of life” is in 
itself based on analogy, of course); and sensory forms, through visual models. 
If we define scientific formalism along these lines, an opportunity of dialogue between 
narrative and science will come into view. Powers’s Orfeo, discussed in the introduction, 
offers an intriguing demonstration of this dialogue by blending the diagrammatic form of 
DNA—the iconic double helix—with its two interlaced plot lines. As my analysis below will 
detail, the first plot line focuses on the events of Peter’s biography up to the realization that 
the genetic material of a bacterium, Serratia marcescens, could serve as a ghostly musical 
score. The second plot line relates the events triggered by an FBI investigation into Peter’s 
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activities; the FBI misrepresent his musical experimentations, leading to charges of 
bioterrorism and precipitating Peter’s clumsy and ill-fated attempt to escape arrest.  
It is a fairly common narrative device to weave together two separate plot lines. But in the 
context of Powers’s novel this device is revitalized by being conflated with the scientific form 
that the novel foregrounds in thematic terms: namely, the double helix of DNA. Readers are 
thus cued to use the helix as an imagistic form to understand, analogically, Powers’s plot 
design. In this way, the shape of narrative crystallizes and negotiates the form of more-than-
human realities. Similar devices are employed in a wide range of contemporary novels that, 
through an engagement with science, convey a sense of humanity’s entanglement with 
nonhuman realities. Adam Trexler discusses some of these novels under the heading of 
“Anthropocene fiction.” In the next section I will turn to a specific example of how the 
dialogue between narrative and scientific models plays out in Anthropocene novels. This 
analysis will enable me to expand on the role that analogical and imagistic reasoning play in 
bridging narrative form and scientific abstraction, via metaphor and image schemata.  
Metaphor, Directionality, and a Model Storm 
Rivka Galchen’s novel Atmospheric Disturbances (2008) centers on a character who suffers 
from a psychiatric condition known as Capgras syndrome: he considers his wife an impostor, 
a lookalike of his real wife. In his delusion, the narrator believes that his wife’s 
“disappearance” is part of a broader conspiracy devised by the Royal Academy of 
Meteorology—an institution devoted to “maintaining weather’s elements of unpredictability 
and randomness” (12). The weather thus plays a central role in the plot, implicating broader 
anxieties related to climate change and the unpredictability of its consequences. Particularly 
significant is the narrator’s misrepresentation of a diagram originally intended as a model of 
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wind speed and temperature inside a storm (see Figure 2). This diagram is lifted from an 
actual scientific paper (Hane et al.) and reprinted in Galchen’s novel; it is, thus, a literal 
remediation of a scientific model in a narrative context.  
 
Figure 2 A diagrammatic representation of a storm, from Atmospheric Disturbances (Galchen 59). 
The narrator observes this diagram, neglects its intended function as a visual representation 
of meteorological processes, and confesses: “I’m unable to reproduce the effect, the effect 
the image had on me, which was, well, uncanny, like those dolls whose eyes seem to follow 
you around a room. Like I was looking at a topographical map of a landscape I knew only 
from close up. Some sense of concordance, and meaning, of a pattern both inscrutable and 
yet, at some almost cellular level, detected” (59). At first, the narrator anthropomorphizes 
this image: he compares the hypnotic effects of looking at the central figure to the 
uncanniness of dolls. Then scale comes to the fore, in another simile that performs a 
movement towards a higher level of abstraction: this is no longer a human-scale, if 
disquieting, object but a “topographical map.” And, finally, a sense of patterning emerges, 
bound up with an unspecified but deeply affective meaning.  
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The narrator misunderstands the formalism of science and transposes it into an emotional 
pattern, with the metaphorical language—the similes—doing most of the work of sewing 
together the intermediate world of embodied perception and the diagrammatic 
representation. Even more productive in narrative terms is the clash between what we know 
the diagram is supposed to represent and what the narrator reads into it. Nersessian’s point 
about analogy in scientific discovery can be extended to literary narrative: analogy is at its 
most meaningful when it falls short, pointing up tensions and discontinuities between the 
source and the target domain. This includes the verbal manifestation of analogy in metaphor 
and simile. In the passage from Galchen’s novel, the metaphorical language displaces a 
scientific model into a lived experience that is deeply affecting, for the narrator, and 
incongruous, for the reader. Indeed, the unreliability of Galchen’s narrator is more likely to 
prove estranging than bonding (to use James Phelan’s terminology; see Phelan, “Estranging 
Unreliability”): anecdotally, my experience teaching Atmospheric Disturbances suggests that 
readers have trouble relating to Galchen’s narrator and understanding his motives, which 
creates a sense of puzzled distance in reading the novel. 
Clusters of metaphorical expressions (including both similes and metaphors proper) can 
become a form—that is, to quote again Levine’s definition, a “pattern of repetition and 
difference”—that interacts with other formal or thematic dimensions of a story. In 
particular, such analogical patterns are crucial to the scale work that narrative must perform 
as it brings together human-scale and nonhuman realities (see also Caracciolo et al. for a 
more systematic, empirically oriented demonstration). Here the directionality of metaphor 
comes into play. Simply put, it is not the same to say “the visual representation of a storm 
looks like a doll” and “a doll looks like the visual representation of a storm.” The source and 
target domains of these similes may be the same, but they are not interchangeable. In 
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Gestalt terms, it is a question of figure and ground: in the first statement, what occupies the 
foreground of readers’ attention (the figure) is a doll; in the second, it is the visual 
representation of a storm. While in the first statement the figure is human-scale and directly 
perceptible, it is not in the second: “a doll looks like the visual representation of a storm” 
involves a much higher degree of abstraction, because it seeks to understand something 
concrete in terms of something far more intangible and scientifically mediated. This is not 
the preferred option in everyday metaphor: in the wake of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s work, one of the tenets of cognitive linguistics is that metaphor tends to bring 
down abstract concepts to human-scale experience—a view known as “experientialism” (see 
Rohrer).  
Elena Semino explicates this idea as follows: “Cognitive metaphor theorists emphasize that 
target domains typically correspond to areas of experience that are relatively abstract, 
complex, unfamiliar, subjective or poorly delineated, such as time, emotion, life or death. In 
contrast, source domains typically correspond to concrete, simple, familiar, physical and 
well-delineated experiences, such as motion, bodily phenomena, physical objects and so on” 
(6). This tendency is reversed in the statement “a doll looks like the visual representation of 
a storm,” where the target domain (the doll) is concrete, while the source domain (the visual 
representation of a storm) is a scientific model of a weather phenomenon. Linguistically and 
conceptually, then, “a doll looks like the visual representation of a storm” is thus a more 
creative and counterintuitive choice, because it resists the pull of embodied experience and 
moves in a direction opposite to experientialism: by using an abstract structure as source 
domain, it brings out the nonhuman within what is apparently human-scale. This is an 
example of how mappings involving the same semantic elements can display opposite 
directionalities.  
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The concept of directionality can be extended to whole narratives: when a certain metaphor 
or set of related metaphors underlie a novel (as in Powers’s Orfeo, with its mapping between 
DNA structure and the interlaced story lines), directionality determines the specifics of the 
interaction between narrative and the formal models that it seeks to remediate. In Stories, 
Meaning, and Experience, Yanna Popova offers an insightful account of the relationship 
between narrative and metaphor; her argument is that, in general, the causal structuring of 
narrative takes precedence over the analogical structuring of metaphors in a narrative 
context: “It is more appropriate to say that the meaning of metaphors is functional with 
respect to the plot, not that metaphorical structuring takes over the narrative” (114). Yet 
metaphor and narrative, Popova adds, can interact in two ways: in the case of allegory, a 
whole narrative serves as the source domain of a metaphorical expression whose target 
domain is not spelled out but strongly implied (for instance, The Pilgrim’s Progress as an 
allegory of Christian life). Alternatively, clusters of semantically related metaphors and 
similes can make “specific contributions to the causal structuring of a story” (113). In 
Popova’s examples, the short stories “The Beast in the Jungle” and “The Figure in the 
Carpet” by Henry James, “the main narrative action is interspersed by the regular 
appearance of a central metaphor that articulates the narrative goal not explicitly but 
indirectly” (114).  
Powers’s novel offers a particularly clear-cut case of a central metaphor, which the plot 
literalizes: for Peter Els, music is not just like DNA structure, it can be physically composed in 
DNA form. In Galchen’s novel, the literalization occurs mostly at the local level: a scientific 
diagram becomes an image that hovers between the mimetic (a doll) and the abstract (a 
model of weather patterns), eliciting a powerful affective response in the narrator. This 
reading of the diagram thus creates linkage between two semantic domains: human 
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psychology and the weather. The analogy feeds into the plot via the narrator’s mental 
illness: through his involvement with the Royal Academy of Meteorology, he develops an 
obsession with the weather. Here is, for instance, how he uses a meteorological simile to 
discuss a happy period in his marriage: “we had a sweet space of time, like the Medieval 
Warm Period, when wine grapes could grow three hundred miles farther north than they do 
today” (17). Human relationships are scaled upwards, being equated with periodic variations 
in the climate and with their impact on human activity (such as viticulture). 
The directionality of these metaphorical mappings marks an important difference, though. In 
Powers’s novel, if we accept my reading, the central metaphor pushes away from the 
human-scale world: Orfeo suggests that the intermediate world of human experience may 
be controlled by an invisible, bacterial world. As we read in the novel: “all the standard 
accounts of human affairs turned comical and self-serving. Trade, technology, nations, 
migrations, industry: the whole drama was really being orchestrated by Earth’s five nonillion 
mutating microbes” (193). The formal patterning of Atmospheric Disturbances is more 
complex, in that the upwards directionality of individual metaphors (such as that of the 
Medieval Warm Period) is counterbalanced by the sharp focus on the narrator’s psychiatric 
condition: from that perspective, more-than-human weather phenomena are brought down 
to the human scale, providing a lens to understand the vagaries of the narrator’s mind (see 
Fortin). Yet it is equally possible to read the narrator’s mental illness as an allegory for the 
human species’ collective madness as it fails to pay sufficient attention to the climate and 
rushes towards a planetary disaster. 
The directionality of the novels’ analogical systems points to different ways in which 
narrative may negotiate the divide between everyday experience and scientific models. As 
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already discussed, the shortcomings of an analogy are often more meaningful than the 
analogy itself: they suggest that movement from one level of reality to another is not always 
smooth and unproblematic (see also Woods). This is precisely the challenge raised by the 
Anthropocene: the spatiotemporal scales involved in scientific models of—for instance—
climate change cannot be easily collapsed into the scale of human, everyday experience, and 
vice versa.  
The novels I discussed so far register this trouble with scale in ethical and affective terms. 
Peter Els’s genetic manipulation of bacteria for artistic purposes is in equal parts brilliant and 
controversial. As Jim Holt writes in a New York Times review, the “DNA in any organism . . . is 
a knowledge-bearing structure, a sort of poem composed by time and chance. To alter even 
a bit of it for would-be artistic purposes is tantamount to aesthetic vandalism—like spraying 
a graffiti message on the Parthenon” (Holt). For its part, Atmospheric Disturbances explores 
the mental illness of a narrator who sees the world in terms of the weather, with 
incongruous effects as readers come to terms with his unreliability. The next two sections 
turn to another “pattern of repetition and difference” in narrative—the level of organization 
that is commonly known as plot—to show how the form of plot can also become analogically 
bound up with nonhuman realities. We’ll see that, along with analogy, imagistic reasoning 
(i.e., reasoning through sensory form) plays a key role at this level. 
Image Schemata and the Shape of Plot  
As Karin Kukkonen points out, “plot” is a multifaceted concept that refers to both the global 
structure of narrative and to its “progressive structuration” as readers work out “the 
connections between story events, motivations and consequences” (Kukkonen, para.4). It is 
the latter, more dynamic perspective on plot that interests me here, because it 
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demonstrates how narrative form is never exclusively a matter of textual strategies but 
involves a dynamic structuring of readers’ experience. 
Arguably, the focus on experiential effects was already present in Aristotle’s Poetics and has 
become central to more recent accounts of plot, including those offered by rhetorical 
theories of narrative (Booth; Phelan, Experiencing Fiction). Also from the viewpoint of 
cognitive approaches, there is a growing consensus that plot is closely related to emotional 
dynamics in the audience (Tan; Hogan). Philosopher David Velleman, for instance, argues: 
“The cadence that makes for a story is that of the arousal and resolution of affect, a pattern 
that is biologically programmed. Hence we understand stories viscerally, with our bodies” 
(13). Velleman’s cadence represents, of course, a very broad perspective on narrative 
dynamics, but we can refine this concept by distinguishing between different kinds of 
emotional patterning in narrative. Data scientist Andrew Reagan and his collaborators have 
studied these emotional dynamics through the lens of a “big data” approach (Reagan et al.). 
They fed a large corpus of written narratives into a computer algorithm capable of so-called 
sentiment analysis, which enabled them to plot the affective trajectory of each story—to 
plot the plot, so to speak—by identifying emotional patterns in language. Their conclusion 
was that narratives fall into six basic “emotional arcs,” in their terminology, depending on 
the progression of the text’s emotional valence: “rags to riches” stories, for example, show a 
gradual and constant rise in emotional tone (increasingly positive emotions), while 
Cinderella-like stories display a rise followed by a fall (more negative emotions), culminating 
in a final rise—the happy ending. 
These emotional arcs are thus strongly aligned with generic categories, as Hogan’s affective 
narratology posits in a more theoretical vein. However, due to methodological limitations in 
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Reagan et al.’s big data approach, their account of plot patterns remains tied to a simplified 
view of emotional language, whereby affect only fluctuates along a positive-negative axis. An 
alternative—and more nuanced—account is offered by a cognitive linguist, Michael Kimmel, 
who conceptualizes the affective patterning of plot in terms of image schemata. Popularized 
by Lakoff and Johnson at the end of the 1980s, the concept of image schema has its roots in 
Gestalt psychology: an image schema is a formal pattern that is derived from perception but 
commonly extended to the conceptual domain in a variety of linguistic contexts (for further 
discussion on image schemata, see Grady). Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green (190) have 
drawn up a comprehensive inventory of image schemata. PATH and BALANCE are textbook 
examples: we first experience motion along a path or balance in the physical domain, in our 
own bodies, but we leverage these concepts to think and talk about relatively abstract 
things, such as the passage of time or someone’s mental stability. (I will follow the cognitive-
linguistic convention of capitalizing image schemata below.)  
Kimmel argues that image schemata are central to readers’ understanding of narrative as 
well, and not just in the trivial sense that plot is often conceptualized as a PATH leading from 
a narrative beginning to an ending. Rather, the tensions that set a plot in motion as well as 
the protagonist’s goals and fortunes create—in Kimmel’s term—a certain “affective 
contour,” which readers follow by drawing on their familiarity with basic, embodied image 
schemata. As Kimmel writes, “such image schemas can be sensed by readers, often in their 
bodies, as an arc of FORCE tension or denouement as reinstated BALANCE schema” (173). 
The rise and fall in positive emotions studied by Reagan et al. would thus be a single 
dimension of this affective patterning of plot, based on the image schemata UP and DOWN. 
But readers’ affective experience of plot may be structured by schemata that are less genre-
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bound. The following is a partial list of image-schematic structures in narrative, geared 
towards my textual analyses in the following pages: 
• As Marie-Laure Ryan has shown in chapter 7 of Possible Worlds, Artificial 
Intelligence, and Narrative Theory, the textual progression of narrative is usually tied 
to characters’ desires and goals. When plot throws complications at the linear PATH 
of the protagonist’s intentions, we have the BLOCKAGE image schema. 
• BLOCKAGE may also be realized at the discourse level by way of digressions or 
flashbacks that have the effect of temporarily delaying the outcome of an action 
sequence. 
• Narratives that combine multiple story lines create an impression of 
SUPERIMPOSITION, as if the strands of the plot were placed on top of one another 
spatially. 
• The MERGING image schema is evoked whenever these story lines come together 
(e.g., with characters meeting or action sequences converging), in what Arnaud 
Schmitt would call a plot “knot.” 
• The LINK image schema involves a thematic or diegetic connection between story 
lines that remain distinct, corresponding to what Schmitt calls a “connector.” 
• The CYCLE image schema is triggered whenever narrative foregrounds plot patterns 
that are alternative to the PATH model, in that they implement a circular or loop-like 
logic. 
Image schemata thus provide a language to conceptualize the formal dimension of plot, 
where the word “formal” has a double meaning: it denotes both the abstraction of moving 
from a concrete plot device to its underlying schematic structure, and the fact that image 
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schemata have a sensory form or shape that is derived from embodied experience. The 
organization of plot can thus be seen as fundamentally imagistic, to use Nersessian’s 
terminology. 
Powers’s interlaced story lines in Orfeo are a case in point. As I mentioned above, the novel 
juxtaposes two action sequences: a biographical narrative spanning from Peter’s school 
years to his artistic maturity as an avant-garde composer; and Peter’s predicament as he, 
much later in his life, attempts to evade arrest by fleeing across the U.S. following 
accusations of bioterrorism. Not only are these narrative threads separated by a temporal 
gap, but they are chronologically uneven: the former involves decades of Peter’s life, the 
latter only a few days or weeks at most. Yet these story lines are equally stretched out in the 
course of the novel and intertwined via periodical flashbacks, which take the reader back to 
Peter’s past. This structure results in a clear image-schematic organization: at one level, the 
forward movement of the bioterrorism story line (along a PATH image schema) creates 
suspense as to the character’s fate; but this movement is obstructed—BLOCKAGE image 
schema—by the flashbacks, which heighten the suspense both by delaying the outcome of 
Peter’s escape attempt and by strengthening readers’ empathetic bond with him (in that 
background information on the protagonist puts us in a better position to understand him).  
Only at the end of the novel do the story lines converge: the biographical narrative catches 
up with where the bioterrorism story line had started at the beginning of the novel; Peter, 
now a solitary retiree, admires “rhythms inscribed in the branching veins” of an oak leaf 
(330) and decides to embark on a new project, composing similar rhythms in DNA form: 
“Making things felt strange again, and dangerous. Patterns might yet set him free. That 
evening, he set to work ordering parts for a home laboratory” (334). As the novel 
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foregrounds pattern at a diegetic and thematic level, the formal patterning of the plot itself 
emerges: the final pages mark a final MERGING of two story lines that the narrator had 
alternated throughout the novel—an effect that activates the SUPERIMPOSITION image 
schema. This ending results in a highly satisfying sense of pattern completion, which 
provides closure and enriches the forward-looking suspense that had sustained the reader’s 
interest in Peter’s life. Describing plot in terms of image schemata thus shows that textual 
strategies are closely aligned with the contour of readers’ experience of narrative, which is 
at the same time affective and formal.  
In Powers’s Orfeo the image-schematic interlace of plot is not, of course, a purely arbitrary 
narrative design, but becomes fully justified at the diegetic level, in three consecutive 
analogical steps. The first step is the already discussed equation between DNA structure and 
musical composition: Peter’s musical experimentations are made possible by the 
literalization of the analogy “music is like DNA structure.” The second step involves an 
analogy between music and narrative organization. Even seemingly abstract, 
nonrepresentational music cannot but tell a story, as Peter realizes: “From the first leaping 
figure in the strings, Els heard again the problem with music. Even the slightest tune 
sounded like a story. Melody played on the brain like a weather report, an avowal of faith, 
gossip, a manifesto. The tale came across, clearer than words. But there was no tale” (280). 
The passage implies that music and narrative share an affective “substrate,” as Ellen 
Dissanayake puts it: emotion structures our experience of both narrative and music, to the 
extent that music tends to take on narrative qualities as listeners inevitably read a story-like 
progression into its emotional patterning. Powers’s novelistic art reverses the directionality 
of Peter’s analogy: the typographically demarcated comments that occur throughout the 
novel (marking the transitions between story lines) serve as an equivalent of musical 
21 
 
counterpoint, while the two story lines create an effect of polyphony. Through these formal 
devices, Powers invites readers to perceive not the narrativity of music (as in the passage 
just quoted) but the musicality of narrative itself.  
The third analogical step brings together DNA and plot via the mediation of music: the 
novel’s story lines become human-scale equivalents of the two strands of nucleic acid in 
DNA. This is an uneasy imagistic equivalence, of course, and tinged by Peter’s awareness 
that the invisible world of DNA cannot be fully captured in human-scale form—a 
discontinuity between levels of reality that explains the defamiliarizing effect of his “tunes 
for forever, for no one” encoded in bacterial DNA. What allows the novel to establish a deep 
analogy between the sensory (music), the verbal (narrative, the novel), and the nonhuman is 
their fundamental patterning. This idea is brought out by one of the counterpoint-like 
comments that punctuate the novel: “There is another world, the world in full. But it’s 
folded up inside this one” (202). The expression “folded up” has a strong image-schematic 
nature, associated with the SUPERIMPOSITION schema; here it serves two functions, 
alluding to the nonhuman scale of DNA but also, self-referentially, to how this comment is 
literally folded up inside the novel’s narrative organization. Plot is thus linked, precariously 
but no less powerfully, to the scientific imagination of the nonhuman world. The linkage is 
formal, affective, and at the same time conceptual, articulating a vision of how humanity 
itself is “folded up” in a fundamentally more-than-human world. In the next section, I turn to 
another Anthropocene novel—Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being, to further exemplify 
the interaction between plot structure and scientific models; we’ll see that Ozeki’s novel 
adopts a distinctive image-schematic form: not Powers’s SUPERIMPOSITION and eventual 
MERGING, but a logic that combines CYCLE and LINKAGE. 
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Stories Like Geodrift: A Tale for the Time Being  
In a pivotal scene of A Tale for the Time Being, Oliver explains to Ruth, his wife, the 
phenomenon of ocean gyres, large systems of currents that flow through the Earth’s oceans. 
Ruth is the author’s fictional alter ego, an American writer living on a remote island off the 
coast of British Columbia, and one of the novel’s two protagonists. As Oliver discusses the 
gyres, his body physically performs their vortex-like movement: “‘Imagine the Pacific,’ Oliver 
said. ‘The Turtle Gyre goes clockwise, and the Aleut Gyre goes counterclockwise.’ His hands 
moved in the great arcs and spirals of the ocean’s flow” (13). Oliver’s gestures offer an 
embodied equivalent for a concept growing out of scientific research in oceanography—
another analogical attempt to translate the nonhuman into human-scale language. He 
continues: “Each gyre orbits at its own speed . . . . And the length of an orbit is called a tone. 
Isn’t that beautiful? Like the music of the spheres. The longest orbital period is thirteen 
years, which establishes the fundamental tone. The Turtle Gyre has a half tone of six and a 
half years. The Aleut Gyre, a quarter tone of three. The flotsam that rides the gyres is called 
drift. Drift that stays in the orbit of the gyre is considered to be part of the gyre memory” 
(13–14). Oliver develops a musical analogy (the “tone”) that is closely reminiscent of 
Powers’s DNA score in Orfeo. Astronomical language (“orbits,” “music of the spheres”) 
enriches the gyre-music analogy, reversing the directionality of his previous embodied 
performance: Oliver’s gestures brought the gyres down to the human scale, while the cosmic 
hints in this passage scale them up to astronomical magnitude.  
Despite these dramatic shifts, Oliver’s analogies converge on an image schema of CYCLE or 
circular movement; they dematerialize reality, sublimating it into an abstract pattern. This 
effect continues in the second half of the quotation, with the progression flotsam > drift > 
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memory. Scientific jargon here infiltrates Oliver’s explanation, determining a gradual loss of 
substance of the wreckage dragged along by the gyres: an increasing abstraction that results 
in the metaphorical ascription of a mental function to the gyres. “Ocean memory” is a 
conventional metaphor in oceanography; it is used to discuss the way in which large bodies 
of water retain traces of past climatological trends: for instance, environmental scientists 
Chris Old and Keith Haines write that the “persistence of volume (heat) anomalies is 
equivalent to the ocean’s memory of warming or cooling climatic events” (1144). Just as 
Galchen’s narrator misrepresents a meteorological model, Ozeki turns a scientific metaphor 
into the premise of the plot: the novel can be read as an attempt to convey the imagistic 
patterning of “gyre memory” through narrative form.  
Thematically, A Tale for the Time Being offers an intriguing combination of Zen Buddhism, 
quantum mechanics, and environmental philosophy. This cultural eclecticism reflects the 
fact that the plot straddles the Pacific, with chapters focused on characters located on both 
sides of the ocean: Nao, a Japanese teenage girl who experiences vicious bullying at school 
as she comes to terms with proximal and distal family history—including the legacy of her 
grandmother, a Buddhist nun; and the already mentioned Ruth, a writer who left behind her 
cosmopolitan life in New York City to inhabit an island on the fringes of the Western world. 
The novel juggles these narrative perspectives, as already made explicit in the table of 
contents, where chapters entitled “Nao” and “Ruth” rotate in all of the novel’s parts. Nao 
and Ruth never meet in person, however; their encounter is linked to a material object—
Nao’s diary—that “rode” the Pacific ocean’s gyres to wash up on Ruth’s island, miraculously 
intact. As she reads the diary, Ruth’s imagination is increasingly affected by Nao’s life; the 
novel intersperses Nao’s diary (the “Nao” chapters) with third-person “Ruth” chapters 
focalized through Ruth and detailing her reactions to Nao’s narrative. To borrow Edwin 
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Hutchins’s terminology, the diary is a “material anchor” for the abstract concept of gyre 
memory: it is a material prop that gives coherence to the plot and at the same time bridges 
the science of oceanic gyres with the human-scale language of narrative (for more on plot, 
the nonhuman, and material anchors, see Caracciolo, “Object-Oriented Plotting”). 
The diary is the lynchpin of the novel’s interlaced form, which Ozeki interprets in a 
significantly different way from Powers’s double narrative thread: while the two story lines 
of Orfeo eventually converge in the novel’s ending, Nao’s diary and Ruth’s reading 
experiences remain separated by a temporal and geographical gulf. Put otherwise, the 
image-schematic form of A Tale for the Time Being is not the “fold” of narrative-musical-
genetic strands, but the gyre-like dance of two consciousnesses that chase one another 
while being denied the possibility of an embodied encounter. Ozeki develops the analogy 
between narrative and oceanic currents in a key scene from one of the “Ruth” chapters, in 
which the heterodiegetic narrator comments on news coverage from the tsunami that struck 
Japan in 2011. Ruth conjectures (based on suggestive, albeit not conclusive, evidence) that 
the tsunami swept Nao’s diary into the ocean and took her life with it. In the plot, the 
earthquake that caused the tsunami—and the subsequent nuclear accident at Fukushima—
thus function as a dramatic irruption of nonhuman-scale climate and geology into the 
characters’ lives. Considering the circulation of news stories about the tsunami on the 
Internet, the narrator wonders:  
Is the Internet a kind of temporal gyre, sucking up stories, like geodrift, 
into its orbit? What is its gyre memory? How do we measure the half-life of 
its drift? The tidal wave, observed, collapses into tiny particles, each one 
containing a story: a mobile phone, ringing deep inside a mountain of 
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sludge and debris; a ring of soldiers, bowing to a body they’ve flagged; a 
medical worker clad in full radiation hazmat, wanding a bare-faced baby 
who is squirming in his mother’s arms; a line of toddlers, waiting quietly 
for their turn to be tested. (114) 
Throughout this section of the novel, the focalization remains ambiguous: we don’t know 
whether we should take these questions as the heterodiegetic narrator expressing Ruth’s 
thoughts (as usually in the “Ruth” chapters), or as narratorial commentary. The 
indeterminate focalization heightens the complexity of the metaphorical language deployed 
in the passage. The immediate object of the narrator’s comments are Internet photographs 
showing the catastrophic tsunami’s aftermath. In a first analogical layer, these images—and 
the objects and situations that they depict (the mobile phone, the soldiers, etc.)—are seen 
as “containing a story”: they overflow with the narratives of the people affected by the 
natural disaster. But the narrator goes one step further, drawing a parallel between the 
Internet that mediates these images—and these inchoate stories—and a rapidly rotating 
“gyre.” This analogy involves an implicit equation between narrative and the waste that 
makes up the enormous garbage patches in the Pacific Ocean: as the text spells out on the 
same page, like “plastic confetti, [these images/stories are] drawn into the gyre’s becalmed 
center, the garbage patch of history and time. The gyre’s memory is all the stuff that we’ve 
forgotten” (114). Narratives, the narrator is suggesting, are discarded like garbage in the 
Internet age, and with them the many lives entangled in those stories. Ozeki’s novel resists 
narrative’s tendency to sink into digital oblivion: it singles out a material object dispersed in 
the ocean’s memory (Nao’s diary), unpacking its experiential significance for Nao and tracing 
its impact on Ruth’s life. In this way, the novel demonstrates the incredible wealth of human 
experiences that are forgotten in the “garbage patch of history and time”—while 
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simultaneously pointing up through formal means the interrelation between those 
experiences and material, nonhuman realities. 
The gyre thus serves a double function in the novel’s thematic system—with both functions 
taking on a distinctive image-schematic form: it hints at the unexpected interpersonal 
LINKAGE that nonhuman processes (such as natural disasters or oceanic currents) can 
establish across great geographical distances; at the same time, the gyre offers a template 
for understanding the CYCLE of material objects in a world whose spatio-temporal scale 
transcends individual life. Ozeki’s novel is full of circles, after all: Oliver’s hand gestures as he 
attempts to explain the movement of the oceanic gyres, children “[skipping] around . . . in a 
circle” (103) in a Japanese game, a Jungle Crow native to Japan which somehow lands on 
Ruth’s island and “[circles] the roof of [Ruth and Oliver’s] house” (173), the “little round 
circle” of the hands’ position in Zen meditation (181), and of course the cycle of Buddhist 
reincarnation itself. These patterns, evoked at the micro-textual level, link the levels of 
reality probed by the novel, from the animal to the human domain to the large-scale natural 
processes investigated by science. Moreover, the patterning of human-nonhuman 
entanglement also offers a key to the formal orchestration of the novel’s plot, with its 
constant rotation of sections from Nao’s diary and Ruth-focalized chapters. Via this shared 
circular patterning, narrative structure translates a scientific model into the human-scale 
experiences of characters who never meet but are united by the material effects of the 
Pacific Ocean’s vortex-like movement.  
Just as in Powers’s novel, the abstraction of form is what brings these stylistic, thematic, and 
narratological levels of analysis together, and what the novel—ultimately—foregrounds: 
Oliver “could see time unfolding here, and history, embedded in the whorls and fractal forms 
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of nature, and he would come home, sweating and breathless, and tell her what he’d seen” 
(60). The forms of nature are directly mapped onto the forms of the human body (“sweating 
and breathless”), and subsequently onto the forms of storytelling (“tell her what he’d seen”). 
Ozeki’s novel attempts this formal translation by way of both analogical metaphors and 
imagistic plot structures, embodied patterns that hover between the nonhuman world and 
the quotidian realities of story. 
Conclusion 
The human scale may seem ideally positioned between the microcosm (for instance, DNA 
structure) and large-scale phenomena (for instance, the climate), but on a closer look this 
positioning is merely an illusion—an anthropocentric fallacy with deep roots in human 
evolutionary history and in the embodiment of mind. As recent work in cognitive science 
persuasively shows (see, e.g., Gibbs), this fallacy results from the close coupling between our 
cognitive faculties and our bodily make-up, which prompts us to see as metaphysically 
privileged the slice of reality that is commensurate with our bodies. I have argued in this 
article that, in the context of narrative, form is central to the encounter between this 
human-scale world and scientific models of more-than-human realities. This encounter takes 
place in formal terms, because science itself makes use of formal devices—both analogical 
and imagistic—as it abstracts from the physical world. I drew attention to two formal 
patterns traced by narrative; both function analogically: the patterning of metaphorical 
clusters, with its intrinsic directionality; and the imagistic contour of plot, which is both a 
matter of textual progression and an affective structure in readers’ responses to narrative. 
When thematically bound up with scientific concepts, these formal devices enable narrative 
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to overcome what Monika Fludernik has called its “anthropomorphic bias” (13), exposing the 
constitutive entanglement between human-scale reality and nonhuman phenomena.  
Two broader lessons can be drawn from this argument, and they will also provide an agenda 
for future research. As narrative theory moves “beyond the human,” to quote David 
Herman, it will have to refine its understanding of how the fundamental categories of 
narrative—and narrative theory—rely on the human body and mind. This focus on 
embodiment is necessary to explain how specific narratives may, through their formal 
sophistication, put pressure on basic human-scale categories and offer templates for 
understanding what is not immediately given in everyday experience (see also Caracciolo, 
“Posthuman Narration”). The narrative strategies examined in this article have important 
ramifications for science communication, an area in which researchers have been 
highlighting the great potential of narrative for shaping people’s perception of scientific 
issues, including the current ecological crisis (see Dahlstrom). Moreover, I have mentioned 
the movement of New Formalism and its recognition of a fundamental continuity between 
aesthetic and socio-cultural forms. As a field that, like it or not, has never completely 
disowned its formalist roots, narrative theory should not miss the opportunity of making an 
intervention in that area, by extending and enriching the New Formalist project. The formal 
dialogue between narrative and science that I have traced in this article is a step in that 
direction. 
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